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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates and explores the factors and conditions that have led Iran to 
pursue its aggressive ambitions.  It begins with an overview of Iran’s history prior to the 
revolution, specifically during the Shah’s reign, which became the impetus for an Islamic 
Revolution.  It moves on to describe Iran’s history its culture, its geographical location, 
political structure and economy to provide some insights about how these factors have 
helped shape its ambitions.  It continues by investigating Iran’s ambitions through three 
lenses—Defensive, Aggressive, and Unstable Iran.  The consequences and the 
implications of Iran’s wider ambitions on a regional and global scale are further explored, 
as well as the reactions and actions taken by the international community to contain 
Iran’s ambitions.  Lastly, the thesis talks about courses of actions that might convince 
Iran to back down from its aggressive ambitions and transform itself into a peaceful 
country that will contribute stability to the region as well as resume friendly relations 
with the international community. 
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Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran was characterized as an industrial 
country. The transformation of Iran was accredited to Reza Shah Pahlavi’s ambitions to 
modernize the country, which “included developing large-scale industries and 
infrastructure projects, and reforming the judiciary, among others.”1 His son, Mohammad 
Reza Shah, succeeded to the throne in 1941, reigning for 16 years.  Mohammad Reza 
Shah continued with his father’s vision and expanded his constitutional powers and 
increasingly involved himself in governmental affairs.  He allied the country with the 
West. Some of his domestic reform policies, such as granting women voting rights, 
eliminating illiteracy and undertaking land reform were opposed by some nationalistic 
politicians and Islamic leaders.  With the help of Iran’s security and intelligence 
organization, SAVAK, which served as the monarchy’s main power base, the Shah 
controlled and suppressed his opponents and those who opposed his reforms.  With the 
country’s reliance on high oil revenues, “the Shah pursued his goal of developing Iran as 
a mighty regional power dedicated to social reform and economic development.”2  
Concentrating on improving the country economically, but being dictatorial, the Shah 
tended to ignore public opinion and curtail political liberties, which eventually resulted in 
civil unrest and ultimately led to the revolution that brought down his regime.  
The Islamic Revolution brought back home the exiled Islamic leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who the Shah had deported for his anti-reform stance and for having accused 
the Shah of surrendering the country’s independence and sovereignty to the U.S. and to 
Israel.  From quasi-democratic rule under a monarch, Khomeini established a theocratic 
rule over Iran and launched the Cultural Revolution to Islamize the country.3  In 1979, 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established as “a military force loyal 
                                                 
1 Shapour Ghasemi, “History of Iran: Pahlavi Dynasty,” Iran Chamber Society, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/pahlavi/pahlavi.php.  
2 Iran Chamber Society, “History of Iran: Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi,” Iran Chamber Society, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/mohammad_rezashah/mohammad_rezashah.php.  
3 Iran Chamber Society, “Historic Personalities: Ayatollah Khomeini,” Iran Chamber Society, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah_khomeini.php.  
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to the Revolution and the clerical leaders, as a counterbalance for the regular army, and 
as a force to use against the guerrilla organizations of the left, which were also arming.”4  
The government nationalized most private sector business and those opposed to 
Khomeini’s radical economic and social changes were put on trial or punished. 
In the aftermath of the revolution, internal turmoil spread throughout Iran.  
Fearing Iran’s new Islamic leadership and taking advantage of Iran’s weakness, 
neighboring Iraq invaded Iran in the hopes of becoming the most powerful state in the 
region.  “The Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and included religious schisms, border 
disputes, and political differences.”5  With religious zeal, the Iranians fought back and 
pushed into Iraq, which actually assisted Iranians to export the revolution beyond Iran by 
appealing to Shi’ites who were 75 percent of Iraq’s enlisted men.6 
Mobilization of the Shi’ites further intensified during the Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon in 1982, giving rise to radical Shi’a militia groups, among them Hizbollah and 
Al-Quds.  “Hizbollah is heavily influenced by Iran and the impetus for the creation of 
Hizbollah was Iran’s Revolutionary Guard which aims to further Shi’a Islamic revolution 
and ideologies.”7  
The aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war revived Iran’s effort to develop nuclear 
weapons. Iran’s nuclear program had been initiated by the Shah to generate electricity 
and as a source of energy.  After the revolution, doubts grew about Iran’s intent regarding 
its nuclear development program, and the UN ended up imposing sanctions in 1995 in an 
effort to enable foreign inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities.  
                                                 
4 “Iranian Civil Strife: Coming of the Revolution,” Globalsecurity.org, Military, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-revo.htm.  
5 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Iraq: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1988), http://countrystudies.us/iraq/.  
6 Farhang Rajaee, Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War (Gainesville, FL: University Press of 
Florida, 1997), 51. 
7 Carl Anthony Wege, “The Hezbollah Security Apparatus,” Perspectives on Terrorism II, no. 7, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=51.  
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Another challenge Iran posed after the revolution was to reclaim disputed lands 
which the country had relinquished during the Shah's reign, as well as land invaded by 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. 
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to provide a deeper understanding of the factors that 
inspire Iran to pursue its ambitions. One question we will pose is under what conditions is 
Iran likely to pursue aggressive ambitions?  
Since the pre-revolution era, Iran’s ambitions have grown dramatically and 
become more sophisticated, as we see with its most recent quest to develop a nuclear 
program.  It cannot be denied that Iran’s ambitions pose high risks to its neighbors as 
well as to other foreign countries.  Despite several embargos and sanctions imposed on 
Iran to prevent it from pursuing its ambitions, the country has not shown any signs of 
backing down or any indication of giving in to the UN resolutions.  On the contrary, Iran 
has been intensely challenged, yet is more determined than ever to face up to its 
adversaries. 
To slow down Iran’s goals and de-escalate tensions in the region, the world 
community needs to devise another approach. To do this requires understanding and 
getting to the bottom of what motivates Iran.  Only by doing this will the UN and other 
countries be able to devise a constructive plan to help Iran re-channel its ambitions 
constructively to benefit not only Iran, but also other countries.  While we attempt to 
explore these factors in this thesis, we will also take into the account the implications of 
the U.S.-Israel-Iran relationship, as well as the role of U.S. interference in the Middle 
East in relation to Iran’s ambitions. 
B. THESIS QUESTION AND IMPORTANCE 
This thesis will answer the question: “Under what conditions is Iran most likely to 
pursue aggressive ambitions?” 
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The question might seem simple. However, it requires developing an in-depth 
understanding of the country, its history, its geographical location and several other 
factors before it can be answered.  The complexity introduced by the involvement of 
other ideologies, foreign nations and the UN also need to be taken into account when 
examining Iran’s ambitions.  Is it correct to say that leaving Iran to achieve its ambitions 
would have dire consequences for the Arab states in terms of Iran’s influence and control 
over the oil flow, the expansion of Islamic Shi’ite ideologies, Shi’ite aggressiveness 
towards small neighboring states, and the spread of terrorism? 
This multi-part question may be especially useful for helping to unravel the 
factors that the international community could use to help Iran address its ambitions in 
ways that provide the country as well as the region with a more realistic opportunity for 
regional stability.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study will offer a conceptual framework for understanding the nature and 
scope of Iran’s ambitions and the role of outside nations in Iran’s pursuit of its ambitions.  
The framework primarily derives from secondary source materials that point to or 
describe Iran’s increasing ambitions.  
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
1. Chapter II: Iran’s History: Roots of Its Ambitions 
In Chapter II, we will discuss Iran’s ambitions from four perspectives drawing on 
its history: 
1. Culture—Iranian nationalism has been a strong force in Iran since the 
revolution.  In this section we will examine how Iran became a vulnerable 
country during the Shah’s reign, and how the unification of the 
government under the nationals was designed to reverse this perception 
and protect the country from foreign intervention.   
2. Politics—Understanding the country’s transformation from a 
constitutional government (pre-revolution) to an Islamic government 
(post-revolution) will assist us in examining the shift in Iran’s ambition 
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from building its economy to protecting and expanding its religious 
ideologies and its foreign policies.  Here we will also highlight the 
government’s abilities and methods of controlling and unifying the 
Iranians to garner stronger support for its ambitions.  In this section we 
will talk about the government’s different “personalities” - from the era of 
clerics to the era of Revolutionary Guards and how these have influenced 
Iran’s ambitions. 
3. Economy—Iran appears to want to control oil and gas in the region.  
Iran’s influence vis-à-vis oil is one means it uses to pressure foreign 
nations to agree to its goals. 
4. Geography—Iran’s location in the Middle East between Sunni countries 
paves the way for Iran to promote and expand the Shi’ite religion in the 
region to both protect its ideology and to recruit more followers. Not 
coincidentally, this assists it to exert control in the region. Iran seeks also 
to protect itself from Israeli threats, as well as prevent foreign forces in the 
region from intervening in its domestic national affairs. 
2. Chapter III: Evaluating Iran’s Ambitions Deterrence Dynamics 
Model 
In this chapter, we will attempt to integrate the four perspectives just described 
with three “Deterrence Dynamics” (borrowed from Deterrence Dynamics, authored by 
Jacquelyn Davis and Robert Pfalzgraff). These three deterrence dynamics are: 
1. Defensive—Is Iran trying to protect itself from foreign intervention, 
Israel’s threat, and the U.S.’s desire to deter it? Is it trying to protect 
Shi’ite ideology? 
2. Aggressive—To what extent can Iran’s ambitions be tied to its desire to be 
a regional power with control over oil? Does it seek to expand its 
influence in an effort to pressure the U.S. to back down in its support of 
Israel? 
3. Unstable Iran—Would de-stabilizing the country bring about a shift in 
Iran’s ambitions, ideally curtailing them? Or would promoting a different 
perspective help shift extremists’ attitude toward stricter Shi’te ideologies? 
3. Chapter IV: Implications of Iran’s Ambitions: Regional Vs. Global   
In this chapter, we will explore the different consequences of Iran’s ambitions on 
both a regional and global scale, and describe why it is important that the UN and foreign 
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nations stop Iran from pursuing its ambitions.  We will also consider what steps and 
approaches should be put in place to impel or compel Iran to re-consider its ambitions, 
and how foreign nations should cooperate in order to urge it to pursue its ambitions more 
profitably and peacefully. 
4. Chapter V: Conclusion: Assessing Iran’s Increasing Ambitions  
Here is where we will summarize the study, as well as make recommendations for 




II. IRAN’S HISTORY: ROOTS OF ITS AMBITIONS 
Reflecting a mixture of several different nations and races, Iran’s history can be 
traced as far back as 2,500 years ago.  The influx and assimilation of different races and 
nationalities formed “two kingdoms which played the most significant role in the history 
of the Persian Empire and Iran: a) Parsa or Persis as the Greeks called it, the Persian 
kingdom in the south and b) the Medes in the northwestern parts of the present day 
Iran.”8  Since as long ago as the Saffarid Dynasty, Iran has fought numerous wars with 
neighboring countries and other foreign nations from as far away as Europe that were 
trying to invade and take control of the country.  Persians fought fiercely to protect their 
land and manifested perseverance and courage even when confronted by better equipped 
armies.   
With the country’s strategic location, Iran developed trade relations with both 
China and Rome through the use of the Silk Road. This made it easy and convenient for 
Iran to trade goods and engage in cultural exchanges between the two hemispheres.9 
However, the establishment of the Silk Route also made Iran more susceptible to 
invasion, and when the country was conquered by the Arabian Moslems in 633–656, the 
Persian Empire collapsed.  With the Persian defeat, the Arabians introduced Islam, which 
slowly permeated through the Persian empire, and proved attractive, especially to the 
lower classes who were the ones most affected by oppression and abuse.   
The Persians eventually revolted and gained the upper hand.  It was their turn to 
penetrate Arabian society, bringing with them their own culture.  As Persians slowly 
spread out through Arabia, they introduced Shi’ite ideologies and expanded existing 
Shi’ite minority groups who were already living outside Iran. 
 
                                                 
8 Salam Iran, “Iran Info: Iran’s History in Brief,” (2003), 
http://www.salamiran.org/IranInfo/General/History/.  




Figure 1.   Silk Road 10 
When Persians gained independence from their Arabian conquerors, Turks, who 
had been regarded as little more than slaves and soldiers, started to rise in the ranks. 
Moslem Iranian rulers and caliphs became increasingly dependent on them.  With their 
influence, Turks later established an Ottoman Empire and Iran was divided into several 
kingdoms ruled by Turkish monarchs who themselves assimilated into the Islamic and 
Iranian cultures as early as the eleventh century.  After the initial wave of Turks came the 
Mongols and the country was again divided into small independent states until Persia was 
conquered by a Shia Moslem, named Ismail, who initiated the rise of the Safady Dynasty.  
Under the reign of Shah Abbas (1587–1629 AD), Iran re-established itself as a 
superpower, but later fell apart when Afghans invaded (1722–1725 AD), and Peter the 
Great of Russia waged war against Iran.  Following the Afshar Dynasty (1736 AD), the 
Qajar Dynasty rose to power in 1750 AD.  The Qajars reunified the country, only for it 
again to fall prey to invaders, this time from Europe.11  
                                                 
10 The Moderate Voice, http://themoderatevoice.com/wordpress-engine/files/silkroad.gif. 
11 “History: Iran’s History in Brief.” 
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Even into the modern era, Iran’s geographical location attracted invasion. For 
instance, its “plentiful oil reserves drew significant attention from Britain, Russia, and the 
United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Britain and Russia vied for 
influence in Iran (then Persia) in the period leading up to the First World War in an effort 
to obtain oil and other concessions.”12  In this second era of Iran’s significance, the 
country’s oil wealth drove foreign countries to vie with each other in and over Iran and 
profit from the country’s natural resources, prompting Iran to protect and shield its most 
prized resource from foreign control.  In their efforts to control Iranian oil, foreign 
nations not only colluded and sided with each other, but also toyed with the Iranian 
regime in order to get it to oust leaders who were critical of their motives.  Revolts 
brought chaos, which in turn diminished the power and influence of the Iranian 
government over its people.  With Britain and Russia competing for control, both then 
took advantage of the turmoil to reach an agreement in 1907 about spheres of control—
with Russia controlling Iran’s northern region and the British the southern part.13 
In sum, we could say Iran’s ambitions not only grew out of its rich history, but 
different actors and players with varied motives helped mold and contribute to these 
ambitions.  
A. CULTURE 
Iran’s culture has been influenced and re-shaped by different people who settled 
and then left the country long before the Shah’s 1925 rise to power.  Known for its 
resilience and fighting spirit, it is said Iran was “initially a nation of conquerors, but has 
been repeatedly invaded, conquered, and humbled by other powers, including the Greeks, 
the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Turks.” 14 More recently, the Shah’s reign and his  
 
 
                                                 
12 “Historical Overview of Politics and Power in Iran,” World Savvy Monitor (March 8, 2009), 
http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=500&Itemid=867.  
13 “History: Iran’s History in Brief.” 
14 David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian leadership 
Dynamics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 5. 
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modernization projects entailed opening Iran’s doors to western culture, as well as 
granting Britain control of all of Iran's oil resources through its ownership of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company.15  
Eventually, the U.S. inherited the position occupied by the British, and though he 
took pride in Iran’s importance to regional security, the Shah proved incapable of making 
his own decisions without U.S. blessings.16  Unfortunately, this did not sit well with 
neutralist Shia leaders. 
Religion has always played a major role in Iran and “Shi’ism has been a central 
feature of Iranian life since the time of the Arab conquests in 637 A.D.  Shi’ism provides 
an ideological framework from which Iranians can draw strength and peace. It is central 
to their identity as a theocratic state and a source of deep commitment inherent in their 
collective national identity.”17 In the wake of the Shah’s regime disintegrating during the 
1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was able to establish an Islamic state.  The 
revolution was a response by the Iranian people to the Shah’s authoritarian style of 
leadership and his continued submission to foreign powers.  Khomenei’s unprecedented 
victory prompted the public as well as religious leaders elsewhere to unite behind him as 
they rallied to try to topple monarchies and constitutional governments and establish 
Islamic nations. 
The establishment of an Islamic Iran based on Shi’ite ideology “served as the 
nucleus and the driving force in the unification and resistance of foreign control and 
influence.”18  Iranians have viewed the revolution as a source of freedom from years of 
oppression and injustices during the Shah’s reign and the country’s submission to foreign 
powers.19 Or, as another author has put it, “Although the revolution’s distinctive religious  
 
                                                 
15 Shapour Ghasemi, “History of Iran: Pahlavi Dynasty,” Iran Chamber Society, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/pahlavi/pahlavi.php. 
16 David E. Williams, Jr., Iran’s Nuclear Program: An Assessment of the Threat to United States 





and nationalist components were Shi’a and Iranian respectively, Iran’s leaders proudly 
viewed their revolution as belonging to the entire world—or at a minimum, to the entire 
Islamic world.”20  
Iranians’ nationalism and strong dedication to Shi’ia Islam can be attributed to 
their history of being victims of invasion, oppression, and control. Their ambition to re-
take Bahrain and some Gulf Islands, which they claim, had previously belonged to Iran, 
and their bullying of smaller nations is, in some respects, a show of defiance in the face 
of the country’s historic vulnerability, and reflects their desire to alter Iran’s image and 
identity.  
B. GEOGRAPHY 
Iran’s location means it is surrounded by predominantly Sunni countries, and “as 
a religious minority, Shi’ites in Iran have always been suspicious and wary of their 
neighbors.”21 The lack of trust between Sunnis and Shia has helped isolate Iran, at the 
same time Iran has sought to defend itself from foreign intervention and control.22  
                                                 
20 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian leadership Dynamics, 13.  
21 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Power and Paradox in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 
2006), 81. 
22 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian leadership Dynamics, 16. 
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Figure 2.   Geographic Location of Iran  
Even prior to the revolution, Iranians had started to diffuse Shi’ism to their 
Arabian neighbors. But it was not until Khomeini assumed power as the new leader of the 
Islamic Republic that Iran began to commercialize and spread the Islamic Revolution 
itself.23 
To export the revolution meant exporting Shi’ism. In order to do this effectively, 
Khomeini and others forged ties with both Sunni and Shi’ite organizations.  They also 
created new groups to help arouse the public and provoke existing regimes.24  One of 
Khomeni’s strategies was to export Shi’ism as a force multiplier in the region.  By 
creating chaos through assisting Shias who were unwelcome in neighboring countries, he 
made it very difficult for any foreign nation to take control and influence Iran. 
                                                 
23 Geoffery Kemp, “Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor,” United 
States Institute of Peace, Special Report 156 (November 2005), 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr156.pdf, 3. 
24 Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous but Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of 
Iranian Power in the Middle East (RAND Corporation, 2009), 81. 
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Iran’s open support for Hizbollah and other terrorist groups has not only 
broadened Iran’s reach in the region, but has posed an impediment for any foreign nation 
trying to influence Iran.  According to Henry Crumpton, the State Department 
Counterterrorism Coordinator, “Its ties to Hezbollah also provide Iran with a power 
projection tool—an extension of their state, allowing it to authorize (or prevent) terror 
attacks as a way to exercise influence in the region or beyond.” 25 
Iran’s strategy of exporting Shi’ism was not just an ingenious defensive move, but 
was designed to ensure Iran would be the central force that would and could control the 
Middle East.   
C. POLITICS 
Prior to the revolution, Iran had a constitutional government. Reza Shah 
introduced economic reforms end re-structured the military and government 
administration.  When his son succeeded to the throne, he continued his father’s reform 
policies and economic reconstruction, with a view to making Iran a leading regional 
power at the same time.26 
The Shah’s involvement in political and governmental matters generated wide 
disapproval from politicians and his reform programs were sharply criticized by religious 
leaders and the public due to his over-dependence on foreign nations and his breaching of 
the constitution.27   
After the Shah was removed from power, Khomeini transformed the country into 
an Islamic Republic, while at the same time exercising his power over several 
revolutionary groups.28  Competition among political groups was not new in Iran, where 
the political system is best described as a “composite of key personalities, their informal 
                                                 
25 U.S. House of Representatives Report, “Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence 
Challenge for the United States,” Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Sub Committee on Intelligence Policy August 23, 2006, 20. 
26 Iran Chamber Society, “History of Iran.” 
27 Ibid.  
28 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian leadership Dynamics, 37. 
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networks and relationships with other individuals and power centers (all of which 
converge over common interests in the form of political factions), and the institutions 
with which they are associated.”29  From the Supreme Leader, to the president, to the 
Majles, and including the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, the Expediency 
Council, the Judiciary, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Strategic 
Council for Foreign Relations (SCFR) and Iran’s Security Forces, the different roles and 
actors who are formally and informally involved in Iran’s government influence the 
country’s decision-making and implementation of its rules and policies, but with the 
Supreme Leader always at the nexus.30 
 
 
Figure 3.   From Mullah’s, p. 23 
 
                                                 
29 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian leadership Dynamics, 40. 
30 Ibid. 
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Thanks to the different political groups and indirect actors involved in the 
country’s political system, Iran’s constitution and formal political structure do not fully 
shape or describe the entirety of the country’s political system. Instead, the survival and 
stability of Iran’s political system is the result of the complex nature of the relations 
among these several groups as each faction is counterbalanced by another power group.31 
These have grown in time. 
1. Era of the Clerics 
In the 1980s, major positions in the Iranian government were held by clerics.  
Clerics’ dominance in key parts of the government and society during this period grew 
from their support for the Islamic leader. They brought him to power and helped him with 
his vision for creating an Islamic Iran.  The clerics were indispensable to Khomenei’s 
rule. He conferred on them control over various important establishments and 
government institutions, thereby ensuring he had their support to enforce his policies in 
both domestic and international areas.32   
2. Era of the Bonyads 
Seyed Ali Khamenei was elected Iran’s supreme leader when Khomeini died in 
1989 and Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was elected president.  Rafsanjani’s 
reconstruction program involved establishing business relationships with merchants that 
resulted in informal groups and networks, known as bonyads.  It was through this 
informal structure for doing business that a surge of bonyads was able to dominate the 
economic environment. Trading freely and unregulated by any political group or trade 
policy, bonyads were able to accumulate assets and improve Iran’s economy.  Taking 
advantage of the situation, they also used their financial resources to consolidate power 
and influence.  Replacing the clerics as wealth producers, the bonyads became 
increasingly influential and prominent in Iran’s political system. The role they played in 
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government policy-making did not only involve improving Iran’s economic situation and 
creating wealth for the country, but they also influenced government decisions and policy 
implementation beyond the economy.33  
3. Era of the Revolutionary Guards 
The year 2000 marked the beginning of the Era of the Revolutionary Guards.  
Under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guards came to 
control almost every institution in Iran, and served as the Praetorian Guard for 
conservatives. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the IRGC), serving as the right 
hand of the Supreme Leader, became increasingly conspicuous in the political arena. The 
IRGC’s role has been to uphold and preserve the doctrines of the revolution, to include 
support of terrorism and expansion of terrorist groups, as well as involvement in the 
country’s political matters.34 
Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains the most powerful among 
all the political groups influencing policy making in the government.  
In sum, what we can say is that whoever has gained access to and support from 
the Supreme Leader, has been able to play the leading role in shaping policy. 
The story of politics and power in Iran is marked by tension between 
conservative and liberal, religious and secular, autocratic and 
democratic, and elite and populist elements. From its ancient and Shia 
Islam influences to its particular brand of nationalism, theocracy, 
petrocracy, and oligarchy, the forces shaping modern day Iran are 
unique.35   
D. ECONOMY 
Iran’s vast oil reserves not only brought economic prosperity to Iran during the 
Shah’s regime, but also interference from foreign nations competing to control Iran’s oil 
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production.  Foreign nations increasingly meddled in Iran’s affairs and weakened the 
government’s capacity to monopolize and serve its own interests. The aftermath of World 
War II resulted in a global economic downturn and the government needed financial 
resources.  Trying to avoid dependency on foreign assistance and investments, the Majlis 
appointed Mohammed Mossadegh as Prime Minister in 1951 to oversee the 
nationalization of the oil industry in order to gain greater control over its domestic 
supplies.36  
Iran understood oil is what the superpowers were after.  It has used its oil ever 
since.  “Control over the greatest concentration of energy resources has two goals: (1) 
economic: huge profits for energy corporations, construction firms, arms producers, as 
well as petrodollars recycled to U.S. treasury, etc; and (2) it is a lever of global geo-
political control.”37 
Rich in natural gas and ranked as the country with the world’s third largest oil 
reserves,38 Iran has long recognized that by controlling oil in the region, it would gain the 
necessary resources to fund its terrorist activities and exert its influence on other 
countries with large Shi’a populations.39  Iran’s ability to control the flow of oil in the 
region would mean that foreign nations that have a heavy presence in oil-rich Arab 
countries would see their influence and presence diminished.  In addition, countries in the 
region would have to succumb to Iran’s goals and ambitions.  Meanwhile, given its oil 
reserves, Iran has proven its ability to continue the expansion of its nuclear program 
through which it also seeks to create instability and exert its influence. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Iran’s increasing ambitions can be said to have been shaped by its history of 
having been repeatedly conquered and invaded by different powers, and by its dominance 
by superpowers.  This has influenced its culture of resilience and its desire to defy 
aggressors.40  
With this culture also comes Shi’ism, which has played a major role in Iranians’ 
nationalism, and has helped bind Iranians together.  “Iranian nationalism combined with 
Shi’ism has led to the emergence of a proud people with a desire for self-determination that 
often challenges Western ideas for the position and direction of the Middle East.“41 
Iran’s strategic location between Sunni states had made it easier for Iran to export 
revolution and Shi’ite ideologies to its Arab neighbors, and empower minority Shi’ite 
groups in the region. The actors involved in Iran’s domestic political system have also 
profoundly contributed to its aggressive ambitions and have helped shaped Iran’s 
identity. 
Revolution enhanced Iran’s sense of exceptionalism and created a potent 
mixture of religious ideology and deep-seated nationalism. The Islamic 
Republic today has the ability to act beyond the confines of the revolution 
as a nation pursuing nonideological state interests, but its viewpoints and 
behavior continue to be shaped by Iran’s tortured history and identity as a 
revisionist and revolutionary state.42 
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III. EVALUATING IRAN’S AMBITIONS DETERRENCE 
DYNAMICS MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Iran’s culture, religion, and government, as well as its growing ambitions, have 
changed over time. Having been bullied and invaded by other countries, Iran has 
struggled to change its personality in an effort to regain its image as a mighty and 
powerful nation in the region.  Iran has played its hand as the weak and the mighty, the 
oppressed and the oppressor. Studying Iran’s ambitions through three lenses - as 
Defensive, Aggressive and Unstable Iran—should help shed additional light on the 
country’s growing ambitions.  According to these three lenses, we see an Iran that seeks 
to protect its security and sovereignty, that bullies other nations, and that spreads Shi’ite 
ideologies in its attempt to acquire a nuclear arsenal. 
According to the Defensive Model, it is Iran’s history of being invaded and 
controlled by foreign nations that has been the driving force behind its ambitions.  A 
Defensive Iran seeks to instill fear in its opponents in an effort to defend its security and 
sovereignty.  According to the Aggressive Model, Iran projects itself via support for 
terrorism, the spread and expansion of Shi’ite ideologies, by bullying neighboring 
countries, and by imposing itself as the leader in the region.  Aggressive Iran poses a 
clear challenge to U.S.-led allies.  However, it is Unstable Iran that poses the most 
devastating threat to the region and the world as a whole.  The transfer of nuclear 
technology to proxies and other terrorist organizations and its use would have massive 
implications, aside from the fact that this could trigger an international war. 
Under each of these three headings—Defensive, Aggressive, and Unstable Iran—
Iran’s ambitions can be further examined and categorized according to its likely strategic 
and operational goals.  These different goals are bound to influence Iran differently, and 
call for further examination to better understand the directions in which Iran’s ambitions 
could take it. 
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B. DEFENSIVE IRAN 
Strategic Goals: 
• Protecting security and sovereignty 
• Preserving Shi’ite ideologies 
• Strengthening and spreading Iranian nationalism 
Operational Goals: 
• Thwart any regime change 
• Prevent interference and repel threats from foreign nations 
• Instill fear 
Having experienced many battles and invasions, Iran has learned a lot from its 
history.  Given its history, its growing ambitions can be justified as a means to defend the 
country from any future foreign intervention. “Iranians view their history with immense 
pride—tinged with bitterness—and consider their country to be one of the world’s great 
civilizations.”43 Under this model, a defensive Iran perceives its ambitions as a means by 
which to protect the country’s existence, its sovereignty, preserve Shi’ite ideologies and 
prevent any attempts at regime change.  A defensive Iran is said to view its ambitions as 
the key to its survival. 
The urge to defend the country stems from historical meddling by foreign powers. 
For instance, Iran’s fear of U.S. domination was heightened by the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.  The fear was that the invasion of these 
neighboring countries could trigger a regime change in Tehran.44 With an increase in 
U.S. forces and military establishments scattered throughout the region, Iran no doubt 
feels it is being fenced in and surrounded, particularly with the strong presence of the 
U.S. Air Force.45 Persian pride has also contributed to defensiveness against western 
policies that would impose western ways in the region.46  
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Some disgruntled Iranians who prefer more freedom and more flexibility rather 
than strict adherence to Islamic ways have found comfort in allying themselves with 
western powers in an effort to pressure Tehran to introduce reforms.  As people divide 
over how liberal or traditional Iran should be when it comes to Islam, Iranian nationalism 
has been a uniting force that the government uses to counter pressure for change in the 
country’s political environment.  Iran’s Islamic government and its claim about Iranian 
sovereignty have been credited as the driving force behind the country’s stability.  Or, as 
some analysts have said, “The overlapping and factional nature of the Iranian regime is a 
source of its very stability and survival.”47 
As in the cases of Pakistan and Israel—both of which have a nuclear arsenal—
Iran’s ambitions can be perceived as defensive in nature.  Out of insecurity, Iran has to 
covertly demonstrate that it is capable of repelling any threat from foreign countries.  
Propagating fear about what Iran is capable of doing and achieving may be a successful 
strategy whereby Iran instills doubt and prevents any foreign country from meddling in 
its national and foreign policies.48  To instill fear, having a nuclear program would 
convince other countries to take Iran seriously.  At the same time, having a nuclear 
capability would prevent Iran’s government from looking weak.49  Having a nuclear 
program “became a bellwether of Iranian independence and a demonstration of national 
pride and technological know-how.”50 
As in the case of Pakistan, which has its own insecurities, the U.S. has 
acknowledged that Pakistan’s development of nuclear power has helped it address its 
vulnerability.51 Still, with the public execution of the former Iraqi president, Saddam 
Hussein, and the elimination of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Iran may feel 
more rather than less vulnerable.  Fear of sectarian violence in Iraq, which has triggered 
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anti-Shi’ite and anti-Persian violence in the past, may result in Al-Qaeda inspired 
terrorism. Other concerns are a massive influx of Shi’a refugees evacuating their home 
countries in the case of civil unrest, and a U.S.-led attack on Iran’s nuclear program.52  
These are just some of the worries plaguing Iran.  As far as the region is concerned, Iran 
would like countries to believe its ambition is rational and is intended only to appease 
and calm domestic pressures, as a sign of pride and prominence, and to declare its status 
as the regional leader.53 This is similar to Russia’s intent with its nuclear program 
following the Second World War when it was trying to gain an equal footing or outdo the 
U.S.54  To quote Feroz Khan “insecure states that lack firm security commitments from 
allies and that fear for their survival are essentially ‘orphans’ in a nuclear-armed 
world.”55   
C. AGGRESSIVE IRAN 
Strategic Goals: 
• expanding Iran’s influence in the region 
• reclaiming disputed territories 
• controlling the flow and price of oil 
• declaring Iran as leader of all the Muslim faithful 
• spreading Shi’ism 
• promoting economic & political interests in the region 
Operational Goals: 
• changing the power equation in the Middle East 
• acquiring weapons of mass destruction 
• isolating the U.S. and eliminating foreign influence from the region 
• establishing alliances and support for terrorist groups 
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If we examine Iran through the lens of the Aggressive Model, Iran’s goals can be 
perceived to be assertive.  Iran appears to want to incite a confrontation with its neighbors 
as well as drag in foreign countries, which would pose a major challenge for the U.S. In 
this context, Iran’s goals would seem to include “(1) expanding Iran’s influence over the 
Gulf Arabs and reclaiming sovereignty over disputed territories and waters; (2) codifying 
the influence of Persian nationalism among dissident tribes and provinces within and 
bordering Iranian territory; (3) controlling the flow of Persian Gulf oil and its pricing; (4) 
isolating the United States and expelling its influence from the region; and (5) bolstering 
Iran’s credentials as leader of all Muslims, including those in the Arab world.”56 Contrary 
to what the Defensive Model suggests, an Aggressive Iran would have a significant 
impact as it acts on its ambitions.   
The expansion of Iran’s influence in the region through the dissemination of 
Shi’ite ideologies and Iran’s full support for Shi’ite factions in neighboring countries is 
one way for Iran to fulfill its ambitions.  Support for Shi’ite communities provides Iran 
with important strongholds and bases outside of Iran.  According to Iranian elites, the 
Islamic regime does not have any imperial ambitions, but is mostly concerned with 
increasing its influence politically in the region and among Muslim nations.57  Many 
believe that Shiism extends beyond the religious arena into politics, and religious 
conversion is not the main objective. Instead the aim in spreading Shiism is to gain 
greater political influence.58  “Iran is active in spreading Shiism even in the countries 
which don't have a Shiite minority...to revive the dreams of the Safavid.”59 
Expanding Iran’s influence would also enable Iran to reclaim disputed territories 
which it claims originally belonged to it and which it considers to be of strategic 
significance, e.g., it regards Bahrain as an Iranian province and also seeks the UAE’s Abu 
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Musa and Tunb Islands.60 Tensions were aroused in 2007 when Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenie’s spiritual adviser threatened to free Bahrain and repeated Iran’s intention to 
adjoin a loose province to its native land.61  
The Tehran government has actively been involved with Shi’ite communities 
abroad in places like Lebanon and Iraq to help it achieve its short-term political ambitions 
and expand its influence.62  This includes supporting “the Lebanese Hizbullahs, the 
Palestinian Hamas, Pakistan/Afghanistan’s Taliban and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards 
which have all been considered as terrorist organizations.”63  For the U.S., which 
supports Israel, this is of great concern because Hizbollah has been resisting Israeli 
occupation on Lebanese territory as well as on Palestinian land.  The result has been 
numerous attacks on both sides, to include war in 2006.   
Though Iran has not openly supported the orthodox Sunni Moslem organization, 
Al-Qaeda, Iran might see potential for a tactical alliance with Al Qaeda.64  For instance, 
it has actively worked “with the Taliban (through its IRGC/Qods Force elements) along 
the lines of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ in its vision of ousting U.S. forces 
from Afghanistan.”65 Even small, low-level Iranian-assisted violence, like street protests 
and riots, could inspire militancy in countries with small Shi’ite populations like the UAE 
and Kuwait.66  
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Islamic Iran has been trying to impose itself as the leader of the region, which has 
caused concerns among neighboring states. For Saudi Arabia, the continued rise of Iran 
threatens to lead to a conflict between Sunni’s and Shi’ites.  The Kingdom does not want 
to witness an Iranian sponsored demonstration similar to what happened during the 1980 
& 1990 Hajj pilgrimages in Mecca. Saudi Arabia, considered to be the leader of Sunni 
Muslims, has reason to fear that Iran will stir up chaos inside the Kingdom by offering its 
support to Saudi Shi’ites.67 For the UAE and Bahrain, with their high number of Iranian 
residents, the fear is that Iran might try to reclaim its disputed islands, as well as incite 
street protests. The gulf country of Qatar, which shares with Iran a rich natural gas field, 
is also cautious about Iran’s ambitions.68 
An Aggressive Iran in possession of a nuclear arsenal would enable Iran to deter 
and defy any foreign influence in the region and would also help prevent the possibility 
of externally supported regime change.  Once it has nuclear weapons, Iran would 
automatically gain a more prominent role in shaping the stability and security of the 
region.69  One big advantage for Iran in acquiring nuclear power is that it could then deter 
Israel from attacking it, and would have the power to retaliate with devastating effect 
when attacked by any enemy.  With a nuclear capability, Iran would be able to further 
promote its political and economic interests.  If Iran can control the region politically, 
Iran would be able to isolate or limit other countries, like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the 
UAE from dealing with the U.S.70  
It cannot be denied that Iran’s development of a nuclear program would have 
grave consequences for the region.  “Iran is not Iraq . . . . It is stronger politically and 
militarily. One cannot attack Iran without paying a heavy price. Leaders of the West 
clearly realize this.”71 
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D. UNSTABLE IRAN 
Strategic Goals: 
• promoting the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf countries 
• destruction of Israel 
• defying U.S./UN embargo and establishing outside economic ties 
• mastering nuclear technologies 
Operational Goals: 
• passing on weapons technology  
• deterring a U.S./Israel attack 
• using proxies to combat enemies 
• fostering terrorism 
Under this model, when the regime collapses, “certain elements could seek to 
use external threats as a means of regaining popular support.”72  In this scenario, 
several factions would no doubt race to take control of the country. At its worst, a 
civil war would result.  Aside from havoc inside Iran, attempts to sell or trade 
weapons, to include Iran’s nuclear technology, would pose a high risk of danger to the 
international community.  Hence, Unstable Iran’s ambitions would prove especially 
devastating, and Iran’s nuclear capabilities and its support for terrorism should be a 
major concern. 
Strict measures imposed on Iran by the UN have caused internal rifts between the 
government and the public.  An embargo on imports, the freezing of Iranian assets and 
other trade restrictions have crippled Iran’s economy.  Several firms have relocated to 
other countries, with thousands transferring their businesses to the Gulf thanks to 
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generations.  With the Iranian government depending on the public’s zeal and fighting 
spirit, the fact that most members of the younger generation do not bother about politics, 
but would rather leave the country in search of greener pastures, is a problem.73 
Nevertheless, given Iran’s long history of perseverance and defiance, coupled 
with its pride, not even sanctions have diminished Tehran’s ambitions.  As reported in a 
RAND Project Air Force study, “these measures may merely induce Tehran to stand firm 
in its refusal to comply with the expectations of what it regards to be powers hostile to 
the very existence of the Islamic Republic while strengthening the very conservative 
forces that the sanctions were meant to undermine.”74  One way in which the government 
has adapted is to present Iran as the victim of bullying by Sunnis and Iran’s surrounding 
Arab nations.  This was confirmed by former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi 
who has claimed that tightening sanctions against Iran would not be effective since “Iran 
is self sufficient in food, energy and minerals.”75   
Moreover, with Iran’s strategic location and its status as a major oil and gas 
producer, trade sanctions are not an efficient way to curb Iran’s behavior because Iran 
can always circumvent the rules and find a partner willing to trade.76 Although many 
foreign firms might have abided by the sanctions, some countries like Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt have been hesitant in their support for sanctions on Iran for strategic reasons.  
Consequently, sanctions imposed since the Islamic revolution have not achieved their 
objectives, to the extent anticipated.77  This was confirmed by the current Iranian  
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President when he reiterated that he will not back down from his foreign and domestic 
policies and will continue to challenge his opponents and the rules of the international 
system.78   
With an Unstable Iran, the country’s quest to destroy Israel could be expected to 
dominate Iran’s agenda.  The Jewish state has been described as Washington’s operating 
base in the Middle East,79 and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s spiritual mentor, 
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, has encouraged him “to make the destruction of Israel a 
publicly declared strategic goal that sits near the top of the Iranian agenda.”80 The 
longstanding conflict between the Jewish state and the nearby Islamic countries could 
induce Iran to attack Israel through the use of proxies. Its own instability could inspire 
Iran to garner support from other Islamic countries by joining with it in its stance against 
Israel.  The potential for all Muslims to unite when confronted by a common enemy was 
demonstrated in the 2006 war between Hizbullah and the Jewish state.81  
E. CONCLUSION 
With Iran’s ambition examined from three different perspectives, it is worth 
noting again that Iran’s history has had a major impact on its outlook.  With Iran having 
been invaded several times by different powers and having been interfered with by 
foreign countries, it is no wonder it has developed as it has. Like any rational country, 
Iran is cautious about its surroundings and is keen to defend its borders and sovereignty.  
As pointed out by Christoph, “The fact that the great powers have in fact intervened 
covertly in Persian affairs has led ordinary people, political leaders, even the rulers 
themselves to interpret their history in terms of elaborate and devious conspiracies.”82  
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The Iranian regime has served as the driving force to unify the country in its quest to 
repel any threat or interference. Hence, its goals and ambitions have themselves served to 
help safeguard the regime and ensure the country’s integrity. 
The lessons Iranians have learned from their past have prediposed them to be 
aggressive in their dealings with other nations so as not to experience the same 
oppression they have previously. Supporting Shi’a emigration to other countries and 
assisting spread Shi’ite influence in the region is one way to keep the country free from 
foreign control.  The acquisition of military and nuclear capabilities is also designed to 
empower Iran and ensure its right to be a leader in the region. 
With a Defensive Iran, the country’s ambitions are focused internally on the 
country’s existence, while an Aggressive Iran displays regionally motivated ambitions.  
In an Unstable Iran, some ambitions on the part of various factions would involve foreign 
countries.  Hence, ambitions under this model would be the most disastrous and most 
challenging for the U.S. and its allies to deal with.   
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN’S AMBITIONS: REGIONAL VS. 
GLOBAL 
The 1979, Islamic Revolution acted as a catalyst for Iran’s growing ambitions.  
Having suffered from foreign invasion and influence under the Shah, many Iranians 
believed that he had undermined and sacrificed Iran’s interests.  In response, Iran’s 
ambitions grew aggressively over the years.  They have alarmed not only Iran’s 
neighbouring Arab countries, but foreign countries as well.  Iran’s quest for regional 
control and supremacy and its desire to widen its power and influence far beyond the 
Middle East have worried some states in the international community, to include the 
United States and its allies. 
As expressed by some Arab nations, Iran has the “ability to influence the 
domestic political circumstances of its neighbors, and its ability to act as a spoiler in the 
peace process.”83 As pointed out by Emily B. Landau, moderate nations in the region are 
threatened by Iran’s pursuit of power. Through the use of Iran-backed Shi’ite 
communities which have been used as conduits to spread its influence. 84   For instance, 
after the prosecution of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s fledging stability and independence were 
challenged by Shi’ite groups that had the ability to influence political activity and chaos 
inside the country85.  Iraq offers an example of how Iran can destabilize the region, 
particularly as it trains and arms Shi’ite militant groups.86.  
One fear is that the spread of Iranian-backed Shi’ite groups across the Middle 
East will cause friction between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis.87  The race for power 
between Shi’ites and Sunnis will then destabilize the region with groups vying to oust 
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each other from power.  With Shi’ites penetrating Arabian culture, Sunnis are at risk of 
losing their religious dominance in the region.  Iran would then have an easier time 
triggering a regime change, especially when it uses the rhetoric of calling countries illegal 
regimes.88  As pointed out by Vali Nasr, “The change in the sectarian balance of power is 
likely to have a far more immediate and powerful impact on politics in the greater Middle 
East.”89  
The spread of Iran’s influence in the region has also been through the formation 
of Shi’ite militias to defend against and fight forces opposed to Islam and Shi’ism.  These 
Shi’ites militants have become more aggressive, to the extent that they now advocate 
terrorism to manifest their power.  The most popular and successful Shi’ite militant group 
is Hizbullah in Lebanon, which many in the international community label a terrorist 
organization.  Judith Kipper of the Council on Foreign Relations has described Hizbullah 
as the best there is at what it does.90 This is further confirmed by a 2007 Department 
State Report that claims that, “Hizbullah remains the most technically capable terrorist 
group in the world.”91 The fear of the spread of terrorism was laid at Iran’s feet in 2006 
when the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Iran the main source of 
terrorism and said it has been operating in strategic regions in the Middle East causing 
serious concern to the U.S.92  
Terrorist activities have not only affected the Middle East, but have also had far-
reaching international implications, which the world witnessed nine years ago in the 
bombing of the New York World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Hizbullah’s 
impact on the international scene has been significant due to its links with other 
international terrorist groups in different parts of the world, and especially since, it has 
                                                 
88 Shapira and Diker, “Iran’s ‘Second’ Islamic Revolution: Its Challenge to the West,” 53. 
89 Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 
2004): 7. 
90 Michael R. Gordon and Dexter Filkins, “The New York Times, Hezbollah Said to Help Shiite Army 
in Iraq,” http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/world/middleeast/28military.html. 
91 U.S Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism: Chapter 6, Terrorist Organizations,” 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 2007, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm.  
92 Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/state_sponsors.html. 
 33
successfully established military cells on every continent.93  Terrorists have killed foreign 
military personnel and civilians alike, have caused chaos in several countries, and have 
been a major concern for the U.S. and its allies.  Michael Ledeen, a scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, refers to Iran as the mother of terrorism because Iran’s 
name is always involved and linked to terrorist activities in the region.94 
The Iranian Islamic regime has understood that to reinforce and sustain its control 
and influence internationally, it has to use its most important natural resource, a resource 
on which the whole world depends, namely oil.  As one of the members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the second largest country 
with an oil reserve, Iran’s ties with the fifth largest OPEC producer, Venezuela, has 
troubled some U.S. officials.95  “Using oil as a weapon by favoring policies that drive up 
the price is a key to this relationship, as higher oil prices fill state coffers and undermine 
the oil-dependent U.S. economy.”96 Some countries such as Russia and China have 
increased their trade relations with Iran in order to capitalize on the country’s resources.  
Considered to be Iran’s second largest oil importer, China has seen its companies make 
major investments in Iranian oil ventures. In their bid to strengthen economic ties and 
gain favorable concessions from Iran.97 
Aside from fostering ties with foreign states and building robust economic 
partners, The Guardian reported in 2004 that London's International Petroleum Exchange 
has been endangered by Iran’s plans to establish a trading market for the Middle East 
region and OPEC members.98 Iran’s ability to forge ties with some OPEC members, and  
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its establishment of a trading market, would signify Iran’s strength and dominance in the 
oil industry.  If successful, Iran’s use of oil as a means to bolster its regional and 
international influence and control would have dire consequences. 
The long history of animosity between the U.S. and Iran has helped fuel Iran’s 
ambitions.  Iran’s desire to develop nuclear weapons is in part to challenge U.S. 
supremacy in the region and limit or restrain its influence in the international system.99  
The presence of U.S. and foreign military troops in the Middle East has been deemed by 
the Iranian regime as an effort by the U.S. and its allies to meddle in Middle Eastern 
affairs and is considered detrimental to the country’s sovereignty.  Iran firmly believes 
that the U.S. wants regime change, and hence fears a military attack is inevitable.100 To 
counter an attack and defend the country, the Iranian regime is gambling that the 
acquisition of a nuclear arsenal would make Iran sufficiently powerful. To deter an 
invasion or regime change.101 
The notion of the Islamic regime developing and possessing nuclear weapons has 
been extremely alarming to the international community due to its “profound 
implications for regional stability, U.S. military planning, and for American and global 
efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”102 A nuclear 
Iran is of significant concern to the U.S. because of Iran’s ability to use nuclear weapons 
against Israel, because of the vulnerability of U.S. and foreign personnel in the region, 
and because of the possibility of Iran passing nuclear weapons or technology to terrorists 
or proxy groups to be used to wage war against the U.S. and its allies.103 The Iranian 
regime has made its intention to wipe Israel from the map public on several occasions 
and has waged a proxy war in Lebanon and Palestine through the Lebanese Hizbullah and 
Sunni militants in Palestine.  Iran does not seem troubled by the possibility of Israeli  
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retaliation, probably because the Iranian regime calculates its likelihood of survival is 
high due to the country’s large size as compared to Israel’s small size; one expectation 
might be that Israel would be entirely annihilated in a nuclear war.104 
On a more general note, some foreign officials are concerned that a nuclear Iran 
might use its deterrent force to pursue more violent and sophisticated foreign policies, 
and might threaten other nations if its demands are not met with approval.105 As the 
presence of U.S. forces in the region is deemed a hindrance to Iran’s ambitions, 
possession of a nuclear arsenal would likely give Iran the power to rid the region of 
foreign troops and press for foreign policies that are favorable to it.  It would appear that 
Iran’s policy is not to use military force to remove impediments to its ambitions, but to 
deliberately increase costs inflicted on the enemy.  The Islamic regime seeks to 
undermine its enemies and does not seem to hesitate to use violence to increase its 
influence.106 
Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons has “implications for cascading, or what 
used to be called horizontal or onward proliferation.”107 This poses a threat to the region 
by triggering an arms race as other countries feel threatened by Iran’s weapons and would 
want to acquire the same weapons themselves.  In this sense, there would be a cycle of 
weapons build-ups and would turn the region volatile, with every country brandishing its 
weapons in order to instill fear and get its own way.  Other regions such as Europe and 
Asia would also be threatened by this, especially since the quest to possess WMDs would 
likely quickly grow out of control. 
Iran’s ambitions have several implications for U.S. foreign policy, as the United 
States has been the central focus of its ambitions.  Allowing the Iranian regime to pursue 
its ambitions would result in greater instability, aggravate terrorism, and lead to energy 
chaos and proliferation of WMD.  The intensive competitive relationship between the 
U.S. and Iran suggests that the U.S.’s allies have a major role to play in helping to bridge 
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the gap between Iran and the U.S..108 Pressure and threats are not options for getting Iran 
to comply with the UN and the international system.  An Iranian expert at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Karim Sadjadpour, has pointed out that Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that responding and giving in to pressure only 
generates more of it109 and, hence, a diplomatic approach is the only viable option, which 
is further supported by Harvard University professor Stephen M. Walt, who maintains 
that the way to deal with Iran is through diplomacy.110  
To tackle and soften Iran’s ambitions, the United States should devise new 
diplomatic approaches and revise its foreign policies towards Iran and the Middle East at 
large.  Designing new U.S. policies must take into account the complexity of Iran’s 
ambitions.  As a first step, the U.S. should abandon its old rhetoric and project a less 
confrontational attitude by engaging in a multilateral dialogue with Iran that would 
recognize the importance to Iran of ensuring its security. 111  In terms of U.S. foreign 
policy, the U.S. must realize that its policies are creating instability in the region.  
“Spreading democracy, using sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening 
“regime change,” using the hysterical rhetoric of the ‘global war on terrorism’—all 
undermine the stability we so desperately need in the Middle East.”112 
The U.S. and its allies should acknowledge Iran’s theocratic regime and recognize 
that democratizing Islamic countries is a remote possibility, as democracy does not 
conform to the tenets of Islamic belief.  Democracy can only be introduced to countries 
whose government and people welcome such a transition and, hence, pressuring regime 
change in Iran to force democracy will only trigger a fiery confrontation. 
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The large presence of foreign troops in the region has created insecurity for the 
Iranian regime. Plans by the U.S. and its allies to retain foreign forces to counter Iran’s 
influence and to act as a stabilizing force in the region have made Iran suspicious of long-
term U.S. interests. As voiced by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, 
regional problems and confrontations can be resolved regionally by member states 
without the intervention of outside forces.113  To help Iran recover its sense of security, 
the U.S. must emphasize that it does not have long-term intentions to stay in the region.  
To make this clear, a timetable for withdrawal of foreign forces must be in place and 
implemented.  Clear signals must be sent to the Iranian regime that only a very small 
number of troops would stay in the region to protect U.S. interests and monitor regional 
security.  Ideally, these forces would work in conjunction with Arabian and Iranian forces 
to police the region.  The U.S. must “underscore that U.S. military postures are for 
defensive purposes and to ensure stability, not to develop U.S. bases in order to launch 
attacks on regional neighbors.”114  Furthermore, to address the region’s stability and 
Iran’s insecurity, a multilateral security framework should be drafted that would include 
all the key players in the region, along with the international players such as the European 
Union and some of Iran’s trading partners, such as Russia and China.115  Because a 
security framework alone does not guarantee stability, participants must stipulate a new 
set of rules for how to deal with chaos, security measures, and interstate relations.116 
These would have to be agreed to by the participants as well by any other countries in the 
region.     
Because of Iran’s long history of animosity toward the West, the U.S. should 
make symbolic gestures that would help Iran’s perception of the U.S., such as 
acknowledging Iran as a major player in the region. The U.S. should affirm Iran’s 
capacity to play a constructive role in the Middle East in terms of assisting with regional 
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security, to include introducing confidence building exercises, such as military exchanges 
and training.117 Engaging Iran to sponsor and volunteer for humanitarian assistance 
activities would help mobilize Iran’s citizens and provide ordinary Iranians with the 
opportunity to meet and cooperate with foreign nationals and, hence, help change their 
perceptions about the West.  Involving Iranians in inter-regional public activities would 
be a good way to build ties with the Iranian people who, in turn could influence the 
regime’s perceptions about and dealings with the West.  
Though there have been several diplomatic attempts in the past by the UN or 
Middle Eastern countries to broker a dialogue between Iran and the West, initiating a 
dialogue with Iran would probably require the U.S. breaking the ice first.  Each country 
would have to set aside its animosity and try to negotiate contentious issues with the 
assistance of other countries.  If both countries are not in agreement, the UN or another 
mediating party would have to step in to try to find resolution to issues that would be 
beneficial for both the U.S. and Iran.  The U.S. should make use of issues that are 
common problems for both, such as drug trafficking, refugees, or ones having to do with 
the environment or health.118  
The U.S. could use the assistance of Iran’s allies in its diplomatic approach, such 
as by engaging Syria, Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East, in talks relating to regional 
cooperation and security.  Turning to Syria would be a relatively easy way for the U.S. to 
reach out to Iran.119  Since Russia and China have good relations with Iran, fostering 
stronger U.S.-Russia ties or bolstering relations between the U.S. and China could help 
isolate Iran and might motivate it to open military and economic talks with the West.  
Providing some kind of incentive for Iran to back down from some of its ambitions, 
especially those that are not in accordance with international norms and could instead 
create conflict within the region, would perhaps elicit a positive response from the Iranian 
regime.  
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Similarly, regional conflicts must be addressed in order for Iran and the U.S. to 
rebuild trust.  The issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian 
lands have to be resolved.  Americans have to do a better job of applying a standard of 
equality, and the U.S. administration should declare Israel’s occupation of Palestine and 
part of Lebanon “illegal,” the same as it did when Iraq invaded Kuwait.  Applying a 
double-standard policy undermines U.S. credibility and Iranians’ confidence in the U.S. 
government.  
When U.S. policy clearly identified the illegality of Israeli settlements—as 
it did during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations—U.S. 
diplomats were able to achieve genuine progress at beginning to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, as evidenced by various armistice agreements 
and the Camp David accords Even if Arab parties did not “like” Israel, 
they knew that there was at least the possibility of a settlement based on 
return of occupied territory.120   
Iran’s involvement in drafting peace treaties to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict 
would be of major significance to the Islamic regime because finding a peaceful solution 
to the conflict would also pave the way for Iran and Israel to mutually sort out their own 
issues.  Here the U.S. and the Arab countries could assist. 
On the nuclear issue, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must make 
clear that its policies are applicable to all nuclear countries, without exception. If the U.S. 
and the IAEA are suspicious of Iran’s nuclear intentions, nuclear inspections must be 
conducted periodically in all nuclear countries to check any non-compliance of IAEA 
rules.  A representative from each nuclear country should accompany IAEA officials on 
their inspections in order to ensure that no double standard is applied and that no country 
escapes scrutiny.  Moreover, nuclear supplies must be strictly controlled and supplied by 
one or two trusted suppliers that are strictly monitored by the IAEA.  The U.S. can 
introduce energy projects in the region and Middle Eastern countries and Iran can 
collectively find ways to conserve energy and support a greener environment with less  
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use of natural resources.  These measures would also potentially help gain back Iran’s 
trust and confidence, particularly if the international community demonstrated its 
commitment to peacefully reintegrate Iran back into the international arena. 
Security has long been like a black cloud for Iran.  Its growing ambitions to 
secure itself have created instability in the region.  With several foreign nations and 
international agencies dragged into the region’s problems, Iran’s fears and ambitions now 
affect the whole world and trouble several states, including the U.S.  Iran’s unchecked 
ambitions will result in dire consequences if the Islamic regime is left as is.   
A concerted international effort by all nations is essential to stop Iran’s pursuit of 
its ambitions.  As the only superpower in the world, the U.S. has a major role to play in 
overseeing and controlling Iran’s ambitions.  Hurling threats will only escalate the crisis.  
The only solution for pacifying a volatile Iran seems to be to continue diplomatic talks 
with the Islamic regime.  Even if prior dialogues have not resulted in success, diplomatic 
negotiations should be continued with vigor, even if takes time.  John Limbert, a retired 
ambassador and professor of International Affairs at the U.S. Naval Academy has said, 
“Talking, hard and disagreeable as it might be, is likely to be more productive than 
continuing 28 years of noisy and sometimes violent confrontation.”121  
Iran and U.S. have deep-rooted resentments and suspicions. Sitting down at a 
negotiating table and engaging in talks might not be easy.  Yet, maintaining realistic 
expectations may be the only hope for a promising and progressive dialogue.122  Working 
to earn Iran’s trust in the West is the initial step that the U.S. must undertake in order for 
the Islamic regime to reciprocate and soften its stance regarding its ambitions.  Therefore, 
the U.S. must aggressively pursue diplomacy with Iran. As Iran’s security and the 
regime’s survival are issues that have long troubled the country, the U.S. must capitalize 
on these concerns and relay a clear message to Iran that the U.S. government will not 
pursue regime change and will not be interfering in Iran’s internal matters.123  “Political 
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and economic reform in addition to a stable investment climate could fundamentally 
redraw both the way the world perceives the country and also the way in which Iranians 
view themselves.”124  
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V. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING IRAN’S INCREASING 
AMBITIONS  
Maintaining Iran’s stability and protecting the regime’s security have long been 
Iran’s major concerns.  Iran’s insecurities are rooted in several invasions and a history of 
foreign control.  Different cultures, from the Greeks, to the Arabs, to the Mongols, to the 
Turks have conquered Iran.  Foreign control continued during the Shah’s reign.  The 
abundance of oil led countries such as Britain, Russia and the U.S. to vie for control of its 
resources, the country’s finances, and the Shah.  Defeated, humiliated, and victimized 
several times, Iranians were desperate for a change—an end to foreign control.  The 
Iranians did not only oppose the Shah’s submission to outsiders, but also the injustice of 
the international system which Iranians feel is manipulated and controlled by great 
powers like the U.S., to promote its own interests.125 
By the 1970s, Iranians believed that Iran was in dire need of a strong leader who 
could thwart any foreign efforts to influence the country’s national policies.  Hope came 
in the form of Ayatollah Khomeini, who initiated the Islamic Revolution and transformed 
the country into an Islamic nation. He was considered by Iranians to be instrumental in 
ending the country’s oppression. 
As depicted by Ervand Abrahamian, “Khomeini is to the Islamic Revolution what 
Lenin was to the Bolshevik, Mao to the Chinese and Castro to the Cuban revolutions.”126   
The revolution was a turning point for Iran and brought massive changes to the 
country, politically, socially, economically and culturally.  The transformation to a 
theocratic regime and Iran’s status as an independent country free from foreign control 
has helped convince Iranians that the U.S. is targeting Iran because of the character of the 
Islamic regime, Iran’s struggle to free itself from foreign domination, and the oil industry 
that the U.S. wants to control. 127 Thus, Iran sees the U.S. as a hindrance and obstacle in 
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its quest for stability and as a threat to the regime’s sovereignty.  Iran has no choice, then, 
but to weaken U.S. power.  To reduce U.S. power requires that it muster most of the 
countries in the region to oppose a U.S. presence and defy U.S. influence.128 By doing 
this, Iran would become a major power in the region. 
This ambition to be the hegemonic country in the region has led Iran to export the 
revolution and to try to create instability by reaching out to Shi’a communities in 
different countries in the region.  Creating instability in the Arabian countries enable the 
Islamic regime to mobilize Shi’a groups and assume dominant power.  Reaching out and 
supporting Shi’a groups (as well as the Sunni communities) has helped create a barricade 
against the U.S. presence in the region.  By being able to make trouble among them, Iran 
makes it difficult for foreign forces to reach into Iran and meddle in its affairs.  Because 
the U.S. and its allies have demonstrated the ability to change a regime, as they did in the 
case of Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran has to explore and employ all available options to stop 
the U.S. from its plans to bring down the Islamic regime.   
To deter U.S. intentions, Iran has to be aggressive in its strategies and use force 
and violence against Americans and those who support American interests in order to 
push them out of the region.  “Iran must first weaken, discredit, and, if possible, humiliate 
the United States while at the same time successfully promoting its own influence and 
power as an alternative.”129 Terrorism became a tool the Islamic regime could use to 
show the international community its capability and the incomparable destruction it can 
cause.  Several coordinated terrorist attacks have been carried out in different foreign 
countries with without Iran’s involvement, but the 9/11 bombing of the New York Twin 
Towers is the most powerful the world has ever witnessed.  It demonstrates the intensity 
that terrorism can inflict on civilians and governments alike, both politically and 
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Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox reckoned that terrorists strike anytime at any place and 
civilians are usually victims of terrorism, thus the horrific nature of terrorism escalates 
everyone’s insecurity and vulnerability.130  
U.S. support and a strong alliance with Israel has aggravated Iran’s hatred for the 
superpower.  As retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Shimon Shapira and Daniel Diker quote from 
Gholam Ali Adel, an Iranian parliament speaker. “England, then America, wished to have 
control over the Islamic world, to prevent Muslim unity, and to have control of the oil 
resources in the Middle East. Therefore...they established an artificial, false, and fictitious 
entity called Israel.”131 After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Khomeini called for the 
destruction of Israel and labeled Iran’s major enemy, the U.S., as the Great Satan, while 
Israel is the Little Satan, which should be wiped off the map.132  Israel’s nuclear 
program, the threat represented by U.S. and Israeli nuclear weapons, and Iraq’s attack on 
Iran in 1980 for which the Islamic regime was not militarily prepared, have further 
threatened Iran’s security.  Military surprises have caused the Islamic regime to enhance 
and reinforce its military defenses and capitalize on its nuclear ambitions.133 
In analyzing Iran’s escalating ambitions, it can be concluded that the country’s 
security and the survival of the regime are of utmost concern to it.  Rationally, it is every 
country’s duty to protect its security, but Iran’s long history of victimization and 
submission to foreign powers has led the country to pursue more aggressive ambitions as 
it seeks to defend itself from outside interference.  The survival of the Islamic regime is 
itself of critical importance to the country, since it was the Islamic Revolution that 
propelled the country to confront foreign forces and put an end to foreign control.  The 
revolution was viewed as the country’s liberation from submission to outsiders.  
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Similarly, western culture is considered a threat to Iran’s strict Islamic ideology; it is 
blamed for the fragmentation of the society.134  Consequently, we could say the Islamic 
regime serves as the country’s driving force and symbol of its strength.   
Iran behaves aggressively when it is threatened and provoked.  The State of the 
Union Address in 2002 when former President George Bush included Iran in the “axis of 
evil” together with North Korea and Iraq angered Iranians and instigated the release of 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a member of a terrorist organization notorious for its killing of 
U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. 135  Iranians’ distrust of the U.S. and its allies have made 
them believe that the U.S. is determined to bring down the Islamic regime.  This, in turn, 
causes the Iranian leaders to “do what they believe they must do to ensure their regime’s 
survival. With survival at stake, they will vacillate between extremes of concession and 
brutality.”136 Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, a top Iranian military official, has said 
through an Iranian New Agency that if America attacks Iran, no American in the region 
would survive.137 This aggressiveness was reiterated by the Iranian Defense Minister 
who said that Iran would retaliate with unpredictable consequences if attacked.138  
“The lesson that Iranians often draw from their history is one of “us alone against 
a hostile world.”139 This Iranian perception has played a significant role in shaping the 
Islamic regime’s growing ambitions.  Iran’s desire to confront and challenge those who 
have exploited the country and Iranians’ feelings of betrayal and mistrust have resulted in 
deep hatred for America and an anti-Western stance in Iran’s relations with other  
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countries.  In its effort to become a hegemonic power in the region, “Iran is determined to 
reshape the Middle East in its own image—a deliberate clash of civilizations with the 
United States.”140  
The international community, and especially the U.S., will have a significant role 
to play in slowing down Iran’s ambitions.  Resuming diplomatic talks with Iran is the 
only available option for world leaders.  U.S. policy makers will have to change the 
world’s perception of Iran as an irrational country and take a more optimistic view 
regarding diplomacy.  The international community will have to show its desire and 
commitment to safeguard Iran’s sovereignty and security, and do away with its double 
standards.  Acknowledging Iran’s capacity to be a constructive regional leader should 
help earn trust and confidence from the Islamic regime.  In exchange for Iran’s 
cooperation, the international community might need to help with economic development 
and stability.  Restoring confidence in Iran and demonstrating the desire to forge 
genuinely friendly relations with the Islamic country should provide an atmosphere 
conducive to convincing Iran to transform its ambitions from those of an aggressive 
insecure power to those of a country interested in more useful and beneficial ways to 
assert itself.  As pointed out by John Limbert, “The combination of Iran’s great imperial 
past and its weakness in the last three hundred years has created a gap between rhetoric 
and reality. Yet, while history certainly matters to Iranians, they will on occasion bury the 
past to reach an agreement, especially if that agreement serves a larger interest.”141 
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